

## Ray Overby Key Resources, Inc.

### **Closing the Integrity Gap in Your Mainframe**

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#### AGENDA

- Introduction: Is the Mainframe Secure?
  - Enterprise Quadrant Architecture
  - IBM's z/OS System Integrity Statement
- Mainframe Security Methods
  - Configuration-based Security
  - Code-based Security
- The Mainframe Vulnerability Lifecycle
- Mainframe Configuration Vulnerabilities
- Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities
- **オ** Summary
- **7** Questions

#### **Enterprise Quadrant Architecture**



#### Is the Mainframe Secure?

- The Mainframe is *Only* as Secure as the *TIME* and *EFFORT* You Spend on Maintaining the Integrity of the Environment
- IBM's z/OS Authorized Assembler Services Guide states that you are responsible for making sure that anything you install on each z/OS system you maintain meets the criteria of the Integrity Statement.
- The Integrity of the Environment is Based on the *INABILITY* of any program, not authorized by a mechanism under your control to:
  - Disable or circumvent the store or fetch protection encoded in z/OS,
  - Access an operating system resource that is password protected or protected by a mainframe security product, also called an External Security Manager (ESM),
  - Obtain control in an authorized state such as APF-authorized, supervisor state, or with a protection key less than eight exploitable to illicitly and invisibly browse, corrupt, or steal data associated with an application

#### Is the Mainframe Secure?

- All installation-supplied authorized code (for example, an installation SVC) must perform the same or an equivalent type of validity checking and control that the system uses to maintain its integrity.
- Modifications and additions (3rd Party Software) to the system do not introduce any integrity exposures.
- The IBM z/OS Statement of Integrity only applies to IBM software. It does not apply to any ISV code or installation written code. You, the z/OS system owner, are responsible for continually verifying the integrity of any configuration based modifications and code you add to your mainframe.

#### What are the Security Methods Under My Control?

- Configuration-Based Security
  - Configuration-based Security is built around a Security Policy, the Procedures enacted to maintain the Security Policy, and a correctly configured ESM and Operating System.

#### An Installation has Responsibility for Securing the following:

- IPL (boot) Parameters,
- Subsystem Startup Parameters,
- Adoption of security procedures (for example, the password protection of appropriate system data sets) that are a necessary complement to the integrity support within the operating system itself,
- Setup and management of External Security Managers like IBM RACF<sup>®</sup>, CA ACF2<sup>™</sup> or CA Top Secret<sup>®</sup>.

#### What are the Security Methods Under My Control?

#### Code-Based Security

- IBM's Statement of Integrity is the basis for Operating System Integrity Testing<sup>™</sup> (OSIT)
- Code-based Security is built around a strong Vulnerability Management program as outlined in your Security Policy.
- Vulnerability Management across all platforms is now a component of PCI, SOX, etc.
- Vulnerability Management on the Mainframe is no different than on any other Platform or Technology
  - A Mainframe Based Vulnerability Program should include the operating system layer and the application layer
  - A Mainframe Based Vulnerability Program should encompass all aspects of the Vulnerability Lifecycle

### The Mainframe Vulnerability Lifecycle



### **Mainframe Configuration Vulnerabilities**

- Configuration-based vulnerabilities are caused by improper configuration settings.
- Configuration-based vulnerabilities are remediated by changing configuration parameters.
- How to Protect Yourself
  - Configure all security mechanisms based on your security policy,
  - Turn off all unused services,
  - Continually monitor roles, permissions, and accounts,
  - Disabling all default accounts and/or change their passwords,
  - Set up and monitor logs and alerts.

### **Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities**

- KRI classifies z/OS integrity vulnerabilities as Severe Security Code Vulnerabilities<sup>™</sup> (SSCV).
- Severe Security Code Vulnerabilities<sup>™</sup> (SSCV's) are caused by poor design or coding errors in products that reside in the operating system layer on your mainframe.
- SSCV's have the following characteristics IN ALL CASES:
  - Exploitable
  - Violates the IBM Statement of Integrity
  - If exploited, can compromise all data on the system and the system itself
  - A single SSCV would allow someone with access to z/OS to bypass its controls without forensic evidence of a breach. They can:
    - Dynamically elevate External Security Manager (ESM) authorities
    - Dynamically elevate z/OS authorities
  - Alter operating systems processing:
    - To suppress forensic evidence
    - To collect information such as userids and passwords

#### **Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities**

- Common to all of the below is that the vulnerability can be triggered or exploited by a non-authorized user with no special privileges.
- Exploitations of this code vulnerability leaves no forensic evidence or audit trails of what was accessed, copied, and/or modified.
- Types of Vulnerabilities:
  - **System Instability** System instability occurs when the authorized program is invoked other than as designed and the program does not protect itself against improper invocation. This improper invocation can cause z/OS service issues including crashing the system.
  - Denial of Service; crashing or slowing the system down.
  - **Identity Spoofing** Identify Spoofing vulnerabilities allow the non-authorized user to create alternate security credentials.

#### **Mainframe Software Vulnerabilities**

#### Types of Vulnerabilities:

- Trap Door -Trap Door vulnerabilities provide the non-authorized user the ability to call a
  user provided routine in an authorized state. (Either system key (0-7) or supervisor state.)
  This enables the user to directly make any changes to the active environment, including:
  - Direct invocation of any authorized z/OS interface
  - Changing user's state (authorized)
  - Making changes to the operating system
  - Making changes to system or application data
  - Impersonating other users
  - Disabling logging auditing (SMF)
  - Disrupt z/OS operation (crash or failure)
- Least Privilege Least Privilege vulnerabilities occur when a privilege or authority is assigned where a lessor privilege is appropriate.
  - Example: An SVC routine or system exit is improperly linked as AC(1).
  - As SVC routines and system exits are directly invoked by the system already authorized, they do
    not need to be link edited as AC(1); it has no effect on their normal use. However, the AC(1)
    attribute allows these routines to be improperly directly invoked via PGM= in JCL, where they were
    not designed to be invoked.

#### **In Summary**

#### What's Out There



## **In Summary**

- External, independent code validation is essential for both software development "best practices" and controlling enterprise security risk associated with the deployment of third-party applications.
- z/OS Clients believe that their External Security Managers (RACF, CA ACF2, and CA Top Secret) are adequately protecting mission-critical platforms, third-party applications and information.
- SSCVs allow security (RACF, CA ACF2, and CA Top Secret) to be bypassed data is compromised.
- In general Code-based Vulnerabilities are remediated by:
  - Reporting the problem to the code owner and the code owner provides a PTF that is applied by the user,
  - Removing the software from the system this is very rare.

# **QUESTIONS?**

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