

IBM Key Management

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zExchange – IBM Key Management

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Agenda – ICSF Key Management

- Key Management Doc/Pubs
- ICSF Support
- IBM Key Management Tools
 - ICSF
 - SKLM/ISKLM/TKLM/EKM
 - TKE

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• EKMF

Key Management – A necessary evil

• Ultimately, the security of information protected by cryptography directly depends on the strength of the keys, <u>the effectiveness of mechanisms and protocols</u> <u>associated with the keys</u>, and the protection afforded to the keys.

- from NIST Special Publication 800-57 Part 1 Revision 4 Recommendation for Key Management Part 1: General (dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r4)

CKMS Design

- Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS)
 - Where/How key is generated
 - Where/How the key is stored and used
 - Metadata elements
 - Entities where key is distributed
 - How the key is protected in distribution
 - How the key is protected at endpoint
 - Archives

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- Accountability/Auditability
- Serve particular application or entire enterprise

- From NIST SP 800-130 A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems

Key Properties & Uses

- Symmetric, public, private
- Static or ephemeral
- Key uses
 - Encryption/Decryption
 - Signature
 - Authentication
 - Key Wrapping
 - RNG

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- Master Key
- Key Transport
- Key Agreement
- Authorization

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Cryptoperiod

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Cryptoperiod – How long a key should be used (implies change frequency)

- Limit amount (of time) data is protected by a key
- Limit amount (volume) of data protected by a key
- Security of the Crypto module FIPS 140-2 Level 4 vs FIPS 140-2 Level 1 (Clear key)
- Who has access to the key
- Cost of key change

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- DoS Risk how complicated is the key change process?
- Distributing new key material

Digital Certificates



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- Certificates are not keys, but they reference key material
- A Certificate store will likely contain public keys
 - So security requirements are lower
- But may contain private keys
 - Needs protection!
- Security Manager (RACF, CA-ACF2, CA-TopSecret) typically manages certificates
 - RACF Database can be the keystore
 - ICSF Keystore

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Key Management Tools

• ICSF

- TKE
- SKLM/ISKLM/TKLM/EKM
- EKMF





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Using ICSF for Key Management

- Key labels
 - PROD.DB2.APPX.D160928
- APIs

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- 48 Key Management APIs, all ICSF Key Types
- Key Generation Utility Program
- Metadata
 - Record creation date/time
 - Record update date/time
 - Key material validity start date
 - Key material validity end date
 - Last used reference date
 - Record archive flag
 - Record archive date
 - Record recall date
 - Record prohibit archive flag
 - Variable-length metadata blocks
 - Installation user data

ISKLM

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- EKM Enterprise Key Manager
- TKLM Tivoli Key Lifecycle Manager
- ISKLM IBM Security Key Lifecycle Manager
 - Security Key Lifecycle Manager
 - Security Key Lifecycle Manager for z/OS
- On z/OS primarily a communication vehicle between drive & keystore
 - Use RACDCERT or hwkeytool to define keys
 - Use the PKDS (JCECCAKS or JCERACFCCAKS with Java) as your crypto provider
 - Adddrive & Moddrive add a drive and associate it with a keygroup or associate a group with a device

KMIP – Key Management Interoperability Protocol

• A <u>communication protocol</u> that defines message formats for the manipulation of cryptographic keys on a key management server.

Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) <u>https://wiki.oasis-open.org/kmip</u>

Trusted Key Entry (TKE) Workstation

- Secure Key Entry
 - Master keys or operational keys
 - Key material generated in hardware and never exists in the clear, outside of the tamper hardware (security)
 - Can provide dual control





Trusted Key Entry (TKE)

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omain Keys				1
	Status	Hash pattern		
New AES Master Ke Old AES Master Ke AES Master Ke	y Empty y Empty y Invalid	000000000000000 00000000000000 00000000		
New ECC Master Ke Old ECC Master Ke ECC Master Ke	y Empty y Empty y Invalid	000000000000000 00000000000000 00000000		
New DES Master Ke Old DES Master Ke DES Master Ke	y Part full y Empty y Invalid	6E2C12BC5A1751DB1152E9C03FF5D104 00000000000000000000000000000000 000000		
New Asymmetric Master Ke Old Asymmetric Master Ke Asymmetric Master Ke	y Empty y Empty y Invalid	00000000000000000000000000000000000000		
Select key to work with	h 🗌	Kev Type		
	Master Key – AES:		▲	
	AES Master Key			
	ECC Master Key			
	DES Master Key			
	Asymmetric Mast	er Kev		
<u>H</u> elp				

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IBM Enterprise Key Management Foundation (EKMF)

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- The IBM EKMF solution comprises a highly secured workstation, a browser application and a central repository.
- All new keys are generated on the secured workstation by users authenticated with smart cards. The EKMF Workstation includes a IBM 4765.
- The EKMF Browser application features monitoring capabilities and enables planning of future key handling session to be executed on the workstation.
- The central repository contains keys and metadata for all cryptographic keys produced by the EKMF workstation. This enables easy backup and recovery of key material.

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Note that while this is a mainframe centric view, EKMF supports distributed platforms as well



IBM EKMF Architecture and Components

- EKMF workstation is online with all mainframes in the system
 - Manages the keys in ICSF key stores
 - Support for other platforms as well
 - Support for several workstations
- One LPAR is hosting the EKMF key repository
 - Containing keys and metadata
 - Easy backup and recovery
- Database (Repository)
 - Configuration
 - Keys and metadata
 - Audit log
 - Available on z/OS, Windows, Linux, AIX
- Key stores

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- Distribution Push mechanism
- ICSF, RACF, Websphere SSL, CCA/PKCS #11 DataPower, Thales

On-line management of keys and certificates for WebSphere DataPower

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Key Template List

10			Key Templates					- 0
Eunction Workflow	MAC Tools							
Number: Algorithm:		Version: Date Crea	ated: []	F(H)	Title: Status:	Active		▼ <u>S</u> earch
Number	Version	Title		Algorithm	Da	ite Created	Status	T
0010	0	Top key - DRK		DES	20	12-02-20 16.41.52	Active	0
0011	0	KEKPROT - IZH	<	DES	20	12-02-20 16.42.00	Active	
0100	0	MAC for UKDS	7	DES	20	12-02-20 16.42.01	Active	
0101	0	MAC for KT		DES	20	12-02-20 16.42.01	Active	
0120	0	ZMK with ICSF		DES	20	12-02-20 16.42.01	Active	
0121	0	Exchange key	with ICSF	DES	20	12-02-20 16.42.02	Active	
0130	0	ZMK with zone	'ZONE'	DES	20	12-02-20 16.42.02	Active	
0131	0	Exchange ke	Alter Key Template		20	12-02-20 16.42.02	Active	
0132	0	Exchange ke	Copy Key Template		20	12-02-20 16.42.03	Active	
0200	0	Base Derivat	Archivo		20	12-02-20 16.42.03	Active	
0201	0	EMV ARQC C	Archive		20	12-02-20 16.42.03	Active	
0202	0	Base Derivat	Delete		20	12-02-20 16.42.04	Active	
0203	0	PREXOR - In	Export		20	12-02-20 16.42.04	Active	
0205	0	Single length	Request Key Generation		20	12-02-20 16.42.04	Active	
0207	0	For input to tr	Cenerate MAC - Selected Ko	w Template (0130)	20	12-02-20 16.42.05	Active	
0210	0	Verify MAC - Selected Key Tr		emplate (0130)	20	12.02.20.16.42.05	Activo	
					-			

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Comparison

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	ICSF	SKLM	TKE	EKMF
Clear Keys/ Secure Keys	Clear or Secure Keys	Secure Keys	Secure Keys	Secure Keys
Products Required	Roll your own	IBM Software Product	IBM Hardware & Software	IBM Hardware & Software
Master or Operational Keys	Operational	Operational	Both	Operational
Symmetric/ Asymmetric / PKCS #11	All	Symmetric & Asymmetric	Symmetric	Symmetric & Asymmetric
Key Types	All	Limited	All	Most

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NIST Special Publications (SP)

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html

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- SP 800-152 A Profile for U.S. Federal Cryptographic Key Management Systems
- SP 800-135 Rev. 1 Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions
- SP 800-133 Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
- SP 800-132 Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation: Part 1: Storage Applications
- SP 800-131A Rev. 1 Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
- SP 800-130 A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems
- SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4 Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General
- SP 800-57 Part 2 Recommendation for Key Management, Part 2: Best Practices for Key Management Organization
- SP 800-57 Part 3 Rev. 1 Recommendation for Key Management, Part 3: Application-Specific Key Management Guidance

ICSF Pubs

- ICSF Overview
 - z/OS 2.1 SC14-7505
 - z/OS 1.13 SA22-7519
- ICSF Administrator's Guide
 - z/OS 2.1 SC14-7506
 - z/OS 1.13 SA22-7521
- ICSF Application Programmer's Guide
 - z/OS 2.1 SC14-7508

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• z/OS 1.13 SA22-7522



SKLM/ISKLM/TKLM

- IBM Security Key Lifecycle Manager for z/OS Information Center
 - http://www.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SSB2KG_
 - 1.0.0/com.ibm.tivoli.isklm.doc_11/ic-homepage.html
 - Planning your Security Key Lifecycle Manager for z/OS Environment
 - Installing the Security Key Lifecycle Manager for z/OS
 - Configuring the Security Key Lifecycle Manager for z/OS
 - Administering the Security Key Lifecycle Manager for z/OS
- Redbook

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 REDP-4646 IBM Security Key Lifecycle Manager for z/OS: Deployment and Migration Considerations (2011)

Trusted Key Entry Workstation

- SC14-7511 Trusted Key Entry Workstation User's Guide
- Redbooks

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- REDP-5305 Streamline Management of the IBM z Systems Host Cryptographic Module Using IBM Trusted Key Entry (2015)
- SG24-7848 System z Crypto and TKE Update (2011)
- SG24-7123 z9-109 Crypto and TKE V5 Update (2005)
- Sg24-6499 zSeries Trusted Key Entry (TKE) V4.2 Update (2004)
- SG24-7070 IBM eServer zSeries 990 (z990) Cryptography Implementation (2004)

EKMF/DKMS Doc

• EKMF/DKMS Redbook

- SG24-8181 Key Management Deployment Guide Using the IBM Enterprise Key Management Foundation
- TIPS1052 Centralized Key Management using the IBM Enterprise Key Management Foundation
- SA22-7519 z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Overview
 - See 'Managing keys with the Distributed Key Management System (DKMS)'
- GG24-4406 Distributed Key Management System Installation and Customization Guide (from 1995)

• Presentation

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 Interconnect 2016 Cryptographic Keys Life Cycle Management for Your Company https://www.ibm.com/events/tools/interconnect/2016ems/REST /presentations/PDF/InterConnect2016_6800.pdf



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