

## Keys, Keys, Keys ... Cryptographic Keys Session 53820

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- ICSF, CSFSERV, CSFKEY, CRYPTOZ
- Is this alphabet soup?
- What is this about?
- This session gives a basic understanding of key setup in RACF and the roles and responsibilities for setting this up.
  - References to ACF2 and Top Secret will also be made

Agenda



- Basics Cryptography
- KEYS
- ICSF
- CSFSERV, CSFKEY, CRYPTOZ
- Auditing
- This session gives a basic understanding of key setup in RACF
  - References to ACF2 and Top Secret will also be made.



# **Basics - Cryptography**

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Cryptography is defined as the practice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of third parties (i.e. adversaries).

- Confidentiality Preventing the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals.
  - Encrypt: Convert clear text to cipher text
  - **Decrypt:** Convert cipher text to clear text

## What is cryptography?



- Integrity Maintaining and assuring the accuracy and consistency of data.
  - Hash: Translate clear text to a fixed length hash value

Example (32-byte hash):

1025 4AD0 04D2 C7D5 77EA ADA0 E4C8 B76F A290 2F7C D03B F03E B527 A045 E200 238F

- Sign: Hash the clear text and encrypt the hash with a private key
- Verify: Hash the clear text then decrypt the sender's hash using the sender's public key and compare the hash values
- Authentication Verifying the identity of a party.
- Non-repudiation Assuring that a party cannot deny that they created a message.

## Keys – Just to name a few

Asymmetric **Public key Symmetric** Secret **Public Key Cryptography Standard #11 (PKCS #11) DES Key AES Key** 


7

**CKDS PKDS** TKDS **KEK Clear key Master Keys Operational Keys** 



## Symmetric Encryption

- Same key used for both encryption and decryption
- Provide data confidentiality
- Fast, used for bulk encryption/decryption
- Securely sharing and exchanging the key between both parties is a major issue
- Common algorithms: DES, Triple DES, AES






## **Asymmetric Encryption**



- Public / private key pairs 2 different keys
- A public key and a related private key are numerically associated with each other.
- Provide data confidentiality, integrity and non repudiation Data encrypted/signed using one of the keys (private) may only be decrypted/verified using the other key public)
- Public key is freely distributed to others, private key is securely kept by the owner. Only one public key can decrypt a private key
- Common algorithms: RSA, DSA, ECC
- Private key needs to be treated very securely and not distributed it is keeping the secret





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ICSF



• Key Encrypting Keys (KEKs) are keys that protect (e.g. encrypt, wrap) other keys work incluence

#### Master Keys

Master keys are used only to encipher and decipher keys. They are used to protect sensitive cryptographic keys that are active on your system.

Master keys are stored in secure, tamper responding hardware.

Master key encrypted keys are considered <u>secure keys</u>.

Master keys should be changed periodically.

All master keys are optional. Secure keys are only supported when their associated master key is active.

#### **Operational Keys**

Operational keys are used in various cryptographic operations (e.g. encryption).

Operational keys may be stored in a key store (e.g. data set, file, database) or returned back to the caller.

Operational keys may be clear, secure or protected.

#### Symmetric KEKs

Encrypt symmetric keys with another symmetric key.

#### **Asymmetric KEKs**

Encrypt symmetric keys with RSA public keys

Use ECC key pairs to derive a symmetric key. Use the derived symmetric key to encrypt another symmetric key.

# ICSF – Integrated Cryptographic Service Facily – ARE

- ICSF is a software component of z/OS that provides secure, high-speed cryptographic services in the z/OS environment. ICSF provides the following components:
  - An API for cryptographic operations
  - Key management and keystores (CKDS, PKDS, and TKDS) for cryptographic key material
  - Access to high-speed hardware Cryptographic Coprocessors and Accelerators, and CP Assist for Cryptographic Function (CPACF)

ICSF supports these two main types of cryptographic processes:

- Symmetric algorithms, in which the same key value is used in both the encryption and decryption calculations
- Asymmetric algorithms, in which a different key is used in the decryption calculation than was used in the encryption calculation

# ICSF – Integrated Cryptographic Service Facily – ARE

ICSF groups the cryptographic keys into these categories:

- Master keys: Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) and PKCS #11
- Operational keys: CCA, PKCS #11, and regional cryptographic server.

ICSF uses master keys to protect other keys. Keys are active on a system only when they are encrypted under a master key variant, so the master key protects all keys that are used on the system. A key is in operational form when it has been encrypted under a master key variant. A key must be in operational form to be used with the cryptographic features.

## z/OS ICSF Key Data Sets



- ICSF provides callable services and utilities to generate and store operational keys into ICSF Key Data Sets (KDS)
- Each KDS is a VSAM data set for persistent objects (e.g. keys, certificates) with programming interfaces for object management.
- Each record in the KDS contains the object and other information about that object.

## ICSF uses keys in cryptographic functions to

- Protect data
- Protect other keys
- Verify that messages were not altered
- Generate, protect and verify PINs
- Distribute keys
- Generate and verify signatures

## z/OS ICSF Key Data Sets



- CKDS Cryptographic Key Data Set (CKDS) stores operational DES, AES, and HMAC keys of all types. It contains an entry for each key.
  - An installation is not required to define a CKDS.
  - However, when a CKDS is not defined, secure CCA symmetric key functions are unavailable and ICSF cannot be used to manage CCA symmetric key tokens.
- PKDS Public Key Data Set Public Key Algorithm (ECC and RSA) public and private keys and trusted blocks can be stored in the PKDS.
  - Applications can use the dynamic PKDS callable services to create, write, read, and delete PKDS records. An installation is not required to define a PKDS.
  - However, when a PKDS is not defined, secure CCA asymmetric key functions are unavailable and ICSF cannot be used to manage CCA asymmetric key tokens.

# ICSF – Integrated Cryptographic Service Facily – ARE

RACDCERT ADD(*data-set-name*) [ID(*certificate-owner*) | SITE | CERTAUTH ] [TRUST | NOTRUST | HIGHTRUST ] [WITHLABEL(*'label-name'*) ] [PASSWORD(*'pkcs12-password'*) ] [PKDS[(*pkds-label* | \* )]

## z/OS ICSF Key Data Sets



- TKDS Token Data Set Clear and secure PKCS #11 objects can be stored in the TKDS.
  - Applications can use the PKCS #11 callable services to create, write, read, and delete PKCS #11 tokens and objects.
- Tokens are containers that hold digital certificates and keys. z/OS supports both clear and secure keys in the PKCS #11 tokens that are provided and managed by ICSF. RACF can be used to define define and manage certain certificate objects in a token (certificates, public keys, and private keys).
- RACDCERT ADDTOKEN(token-name)

## **ICSF** Display



```
CSFM668I 09.49.31 ICSF OPTIONS 112
  SYSNAME = TST1
                        ICSF LEVEL = HCR77D1
   LATEST ICSF CODE CHANGE = 08/16/21
    Refdate update interval in Days/HH.MM.SS = 001/00.00.00
    Refdate update period in Days/HH.MM.SS = 000/01.00.00
    MASTERKCVLEN = display ALL digits
    AUDITKEYLIFECKDS: Audit CCA symmetric key lifecycle events
      SYSNAME LABEL
                        TOKEN
                         Yes
      TST1
                Yes
    AUDITKEYLIFEPKDS: Audit CCA asymmetric key lifecycle events
      SYSNAME
               LABEL
                        TOKEN
     TST1
                Yes
                         Yes
    AUDITKEYLIFETKDS: Audit PKCS #11 key lifecycle events
      SYSNAME
               токовј
                        SESSOBJ
      TST1
                No
                         No
    AUDITKEYUSGCKDS: Audit CCA symmetric key usage events
      SYSNAME
               LABEL
                        TOKEN
                                  Interval Days/HH.MM.SS
      TST1
                Yes
                         Yes
                                            001/00.00.00
    AUDITKEYUSGPKDS: Audit CCA asymmetric key usage events
      SYSNAME
               LABEL
                        TOKEN
                                  Interval Days/HH.MM.SS
     TST1
                Yes
                         Yes
                                            001/00.00.00
    AUDITPKCS11USG: Audit PKCS #11 usage events
```

## **z/OS ICSF – Protecting Resources**



- The CSFSERV class controls access to CCA and PKCS #11 services and ICSF TSO panel utilities.
- The CSFKEYS class controls access to cryptographic keys in the ICSF Key Data Sets (CKDS and PKDS) and enables/disables the use of protected keys.
- The CRYPTOZ class controls access to, and defines a policy for PKCS#11 token in the Token Data Set (TKDS).
- The XCSFKEY class controls the ability to export a symmetric key with the Symmetric Key Export callable services.

## z/OS ICSF – Protecting Resources



ICSF Key Data Sets

• The DATASET class can be configured to protect the ICSF Key Data Sets.

#### **ICSF MVS Console Commands**

 The OPERCMDS class controls the ability to issue MVS console commands for "DISPLAY ICSF" and "SETICSF".

FACILITY class - data set encryption can be restricted to only security Administrators - STGADMIN profiles

• XFACILIT class- Enables granular key label access



- CRYPTOZ Controls access to PKCS #11 tokens in the TKDS.
- CSFKEYS Controls access to ICSF cryptographic keys in the CKDS and the PKDS.
  - GCSFKEYS Resource group class for the CSFKEYS class.
- XCSFKEY Controls the exportation of ICSF cryptographic keys. Protects the symmetric key export of keys in the CKDS.
  - GXCSFKEY Resource group class for the XCSFKEY class.
- CSFSERV Controls access to ICSF cryptographic services protects the APIs and the panels.



- **CRYPTOZ -** The CRYPTOZ class controls access to and defines a policy for PKCS#11 tokens in the TKDS. PKCS#11 token access control is unique in that the tokens have different access levels and a differentiation between standard users and security officers. For each token, there are two resources in the CRYPTOZ class for controlling access to tokens:
- The CRYPTOZ class does not grant access to the resource if there is no profile



- The resource USER.token-name controls the access of the User role to the token.
- The resource SO.token-name controls the access of the Security Officer (SO) role to the token.
- The CLEARKEY.token-name resource within the CRYPTOZ class controls the ICSF policy for creating a clear key versus a secure key.
- Tokens can be added using:
  - RACDCERT ADDTOKEN(token-name)
  - ICSF panels



#### racdcert addtoken(MFAtoken1) Insufficient authority to access token MFATOKEN1.



ICH408I USER( ) GROUP ) NAME(JULES CSF1TRC CL(CSFSERV ) INSUFFICIENT ACCESS AUTHORITY ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )



#### **CSFKEYS**

The CSFKEYS class controls access to the cryptographic keys in the CKDS and PKDS. A UACC of NONE is preferred for customer installations. Access to specific keys or tokens should be granted only to those processes and people who need access.

Note: The CSFKEYS class grants access to the key if there is no profile

Define appropriate profiles in the CSFKEYS class:

RDEFINE CSFKEYS label UACC(NONE)

other-optional-operands

where *label* is the label by which the key is defined in the CKDS or PKDS. Note that if an application uses a token instead of a key label, no authorization checking is done on the use of the key.

READ authority is the default authority for access to PKDS and CKDS labels for all usage.



### XCSFKEY

The XCSFKEY class controls the ability to export a symmetric key with the Symmetric Key Export (CSNDSYX, CSNFSYX, or CSNDSXD) callable service.

GXCSFKEY - Resource group class for the XCSFKEY class

By enabling the Symmetric Key Label Export control for AES or DES keys, and creating profiles in the XCSFKEY resource class, you can increase the level of access authority that is needed to export AES or DES keys without increasing the level of authority that is needed to access the keys for other operations.

The XCSFKEY class does not grant access to the resource if there is no profile

The XCSFKEY class controls authorization checks when the symmetric key export services are called.



#### **CSFSERV**

The CSFSERV class controls access to ICSF callable services and ICSF TSO panel utilities.

A UACC of NONE is preferred for customer installations. Access to cryptographic services and panels should be granted only to those processes and people who need access.

The CSFSERV class grants access to the service if there is no covering profile, but with the following exceptions:

- Key Data Set Update (CSFKDU and CSFKDU6)
- Key Data Set Record Retrieve (CSFRRT and CSFRRT6)



ICH408I USER( CSFIQA CL(CSFSERV) WARNING: INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY - TEMPORARY ACCESS ALLOWED FROM ** (G)	1)	055
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE ) ICH408I USER( CSF1GKP CL(CSFSERV) WARNING: INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY - TEMPORARY ACCESS ALLOWED	1)	056
<pre>FROM ** (G) ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE ) ICH408I USER( USER.MY.TEMP.TOKEN CL(CRYPTOZ ) INSUFFICIENT ACCESS AUTHORITY FROM USER.** (G)</pre>	1)	057
ACCESS INTENT(UPDATE ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE ) ICH408I USER( SO.MY.TEMP.TOKEN CL(CRYPTOZ ) INSUFFICIENT ACCESS AUTHORITY FROM SO.** (G)	1)	058
ACCESS INTENT(CONTROL) ACCESS ALLOWED(UPDATE )		



ICH408I USER( CSF1GKP CL(CSFSERV )	1)	334
WARNING: INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY - TEMPORARY ACCESS ALLOWED		
FROM ** (G) ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )		
ICH408I USER(	1)	335
CSF1PKV CL(CSFSERV )	-	
WARNING: INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY - TEMPORARY ACCESS ALLOWED FROM ** (G)		
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )		
ICH408I USER(	1)	336
CSF1PKS CL(CSFSERV ) WARNING: INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY - TEMPORARY ACCESS ALLOWED	-	
FROM ** (G)		
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )		
ICH408I USER	1)	337
CSF1TRD CL(CSFSERV ) WARNING: INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY - TEMPORARY ACCESS ALLOWED		
FROM ** (G)		
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )		220
ICH408I USER( CSF1TRD CL(CSFSERV )	I)	338
WARNING: INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY - TEMPORARY ACCESS ALLOWED		
FROM ** (G)		
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE ) ICH408I USER(	1 )	220
CSF1TRD CL(CSFSERV )	I J	339
WARNING: INSUFFICIENT AUTHORITY - TEMPORARY ACCESS ALLOWED		
FROM ** (G)		
ACCESS INTENT(READ ) ACCESS ALLOWED(NONE )		



## **ICSF & RACF Healthchecks**

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**ICSF COPROCESSOR STA TE\_NEGCHANGE** - This is a status check. The check detects a degradation in the state of any cryptographic coprocessor or accelerator on the system. The check is activated during the initialization of ICSF. The check is performed on a daily basis.

CSFH0012I (ICSF,ICSF\_COPROCESSOR\_STATE\_NEGCHANGE): Check performed with no problems found.



ICSF\_DEPRECATED\_SERV\_WAR NINGS - This is a deprecated services health check. The check detects the use of services that are no longer enhanced and are not recommended for continued use. The check is activated when the ICSF task is started and runs on a periodic (daily) basis.

CSFH0013I (ICSF,ICSF\_DEPRECATED\_SERV\_WARNINGS): Check performed with no problems found.

END TIME: 09/27/2021 06:01:18.327953 STATUS: SUCCESSFUL



**ICSF KEY EXPIRATION - This is a** status check. The check detects records in the active key data sets that have the key material validity end date metadata set and will expire within the specified interval. The active CKDS, PKDS, and TKDS are checked. The label of all records that will expire will be listed along with the expiration date.

IBMICSF, ICSF KEY EXPIRATION SYSTEM: TST1 09/27/2021 06:01:18.327841 CHECK SEVERITY: MEDIUM 20140101 PARM: DAYS(60) CSFH0030I Cryptographic records expiring in 60 days. Active CKDS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFCKDSB ione ctive PKDS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFPKDSB lone CSFH0032I No KDS records will expire within the next 60 days. 09/27/2021 06:01:18.328318



**ICSF MASTER KEY CONSISTENC** Y - This is a master key health check. The check detects inconsistencies in the states of the coprocessor master keys. The check is activated when the ICSF task is started and runs on a periodic (daily) basis. The check determines when the state of a master key on at least one coprocessor is not in accord with the state on the other coprocessors.

CSFH0014I (ICSF,ICSF\_MASTER\_KEY\_CONSISTENCY): The master keys are consistent across the current set of coprocessors.



**ICSF OPTIONS CHECKS - This** check examines the value of some of the ICSF installation options that can affect the performance of your ICSF applications. The check reports whether the current setting matches the option setting supplied in the parameter or the default setting. Any option setting not specified in the parameter will be checked for the default described for that option.

CSFH0036I (ICSF,ICSF\_OPTIONS\_CHECKS): All ICSF options checked were set to the specified values.



ICSF\_PKCS\_PSS\_SUPPORT - check detects whether the current hardware configuration supports PKCS-PSS algorithms. The ICSF administrator can use this check to determine if PKCS-PSS algorithms are available for operations, and if not, update their configuration with an active ECC master key or with a coprocessor of CCA 5.3 or above. CSFH0045I Check for PKCS-PSS availability.

CSFH0046I RSA keys can be used for PKCS-PSS algorithms.

END TIME: 09/10/2021 06:01:18.238642 STATUS: SUCCESSFUL



**ICSF UNSUPPORTED CCA KEYS - The** Cryptographic Coprocessor Feature (CCF) supported cryptographic algorithms that are now not supported on newer Crypto Express adapters. Keys for these unsupported algorithms and services may have been stored in the CKDS and PKDS. The ICSF UNSUPPORTED CCA KEYS health check lists the label of records in the active CKDS and PKDS with keys that are not supported by the current cryptographic adapters. The ICSF administrator can use the list to determine if the records should be deleted. The administrator can archive the records if the format of the CKDS and PKDS is the common record format (KDSR). For the PKDS, all records with DSS public or private key tokens will be listed. For the CKDS, all records with DES ANSI X9.17 keys and DES datatranslation keys (key type DATAXLAT) will be listed.

#### 

END TIME: 09/10/2021 06:01:18.238642 STATUS: SUCCESSFUL



ICSF\_UNSUPPORTED\_CCA\_KEYS - The Cryptographic Coprocessor Feature (CCF) supported cryptographic algorithms that are now not supported on newer Crypto Express adapters. Keys for these unsupported algorithms and services may have been stored in the CKDS and PKDS. The

HECK(IBMICSF,ICSF\_UNSUPPORTED\_CCA\_KEYS) SYSTEM: TST1 09/10/2021 06:01:18.238247 DATE: 20160201 CHECK SEVERITY: LOW SFH0038I Check for unsupported CCA cryptographic keys in CKDS and PKDS ctive CKDS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFCKDSB ine ctive PKDS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFPKDSB ne SFH0039I No unsupported CCA keys were found in the CKDS or PKDS ID TIME: 09/10/2021 06:01:18.238407 STATUS: SUCCESSFUL DOTTOM OF DOTO



The ICSF WEAK CCA KEYS health check will list the labels of records in the active PKDS with keys that are considered cryptographically weak. The ICSF administrator can use the list to determine if the records should be replaced by cryptographically strong keys. The administrator can archive the records if the format of the PKDS is the common record format (KDSR).

****************************
CHECK(IBMICSF,ICSF_WEAK_CCA_KEYS)
SYSPLEX: SESG SYSTEM: TST1
START TIME: 09/10/2021 06:01:18.238385
CHECK DATE: 20181101 CHECK SEVERITY: LOW
CSFH0042I Check for weak CCA cryptographic keys in the PKDS
Active PKDS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFPKDSB
NI
None
CSFH0043I No weak CCA cryptographic keys were found in the PKDS
CSENDERSE NO WEAK CCH CEUDEOUTAPHIC KEUS WEEE FOUND IN THE PROS
END TIME: 09/10/2021 06:01:18.238604 STATUS: SUCCESSFUL
**************************************



The ICSF migration checks are:

- ICSFMIG\_DEPRECATED\_SERV\_WARNINGS This is a migration check. If you are migrating
  to ICSF FMID HCR77A1 or a later release, you should run this check on your system before
  installing the new release of ICSF. The check detects the use of services which will not be
  supported in subsequent releases of ICSF. The check is not active when ICSF is started and
  must be activated to perform the check. Once activated the check will be performed on a daily
  basis.
- ICSFMIG\_MASTER\_KEY\_CONSISTENCY This is a migration check introduced in APAR OA39489. The check detects inconsistencies in the states of the cryptographic coprocessor master keys. The check is intended to warn the user of potential problems when migrating from pre-FMID HCR7780 releases of ICSF to the FMIDs HCR7780, HCR7790, or HCR77A0 releases of ICSF. The check is inactive when ICSF is started. When activated, it performs a one time check on the states of the coprocessor master keys. If a master key is not consistent across the available coprocessors, a problem condition is assumed and a health checker exception message is generated for the administrator's attention.



The ICSF migration checks are:

- ICSFMIG7731\_ICSF\_RETAINED\_RSAKEY This is a migration check. The check detects the presence of retained keys on the cryptographic coprocessors. Retained keys will not be supported in subsequent releases of ICSF. Existing retained keys will become unusable.
- ICSFMIG77A1\_COPROCESSOR\_ACTIVE This is a migration check. If you are migrating to ICSF FMID HCR77A1 or a later release, you should run this check on your system before installing the new release of ICSF.
- ICSFMIG77A1\_TKDS\_OBJECT This is a migration check. If you are migrating to ICSF FMID HCR77A1 or a later release, you should run this check on your system before installing the new release of ICSF.
- ICSFMIG77A1\_UNSUPPORTED\_HW This is a migration check. If you are migrating to ICSF FMID HCR77A1 or a later release, you should run this check on your system before installing the new release of ICSF.



The following health checks require access to the listed CSFSERV service profiles:

- ICSF\_KEY\_EXPIRATION
  - CSFKDSL
  - CSFKDMR
- ICSFMIG7731\_ICSF\_RETAINED\_RSAKEY
  - CSFRKL
- ICSF\_UNSUPPORTED\_CCA\_KEYS
  - CSFKDSL
- ICSF\_WEAK\_CCA\_KEYS
  - CSFKDSL

NOTE: If ICSF is running with CHECKAUTH(YES) specified in the options data set and the access to service through the CSFSERV SAF class is fully controlled, authority to specific services is required for some health checks

#### **RACF – Health Checks**



#### RACF\_CSFKEYS\_ACTIVE, for the CSFSERV resource class.

#### 

IRRH228I The class CSFKEYS is active.

**RACF – Health Checks** 



# RACF\_CSFSERV\_ACTIVE, for the CSFSERV resource class.

#### 

CHECK(IBMRACF,RACF\_CSFSERV\_ACTIVE) SYSPLEX: SESG SYSTEM: TST1 START TIME: 09/27/2021 06:00:05.712241 CHECK DATE: 20140106 CHECK SEVERITY: MEDIUM CHECK PARM: CSFSERV

IRRH228I The class CSFSERV is active.

END TIME: 09/27/2021 06:00:05.712463 STATUS: SUCCESSFUL

**RACF – Health Checks** 



#### RACF\_SENSITIVE\_RESOUR CES, for the ICSF key data sets.

	ICSF Dataset Re	port				
S Data Set Name		Vol	UACC	Warn	ID*	User
E SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFPKDSB E SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFCKDSB		DCSYS1 DCSYS1			 ****	

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# Auditing



CKDS - The audit records that are logged are dependent on the AUDITKEYLIFECKDS option setting.

PKDS - The audit records that are logged are dependent on the AUDITKEYLIFEPKDS option setting

TKDS - The audit records that are logged are dependent on the AUDITKEYLIFETKDS option setting.

RACF - CSFSERV, CSFKEYS, CRYPTOZ, XCSFKEYS

# Auditing



- Subtype 1 is written whenever ICSF is started or the options refresh is performed.
- Subtype 7 is written when an operational key is imported from a coprocessor.
- Subtype 8 is written whenever the in-storage copy of the CKDS is refreshed.
- **Subtype 9** is written whenever the CKDS is updated by a dynamic CKDS update service or the KDS Metadata write service or the CKDS KEYS utility.
- **Subtype 13** is written whenever the PKDS is updated by a dynamic PKDS update service or the KDS Metadata write service or the PKDS KEYS utility.
- **Subtype 14** is written when a clear master key part is entered on a cryptographic coprocessor.
- **Subtype 15** is written whenever a retained key is created or deleted.
- **Subtype 16** is written for each request and reply from calls to the CSFPCI service by TKE.
- **Subtype 18** is written when the configuration of a coprocessor or accelerator changes.
- Subtype 19 no longer written.
- **Subtype 20** is written periodically to record processing times for coprocessors or accelerators.

)PTI Syste	7D1 ON ===> em Name: TST1 r the number of t	Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility Crypto Domain: 2 desired option.
2 3 4 5 6 7		Management of Cryptographic Coprocessors Master key set or change, KDS Processing Installation options Administrative Control Functions ICSF Utilities Pass Phrase Master Key/KDS Initialization TKE PKA Direct Key Load Key Generator Utility processes Management of User Defined Extensions

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Press ENTER to go to the selected option. Press END to exit to the previous menu.

	DS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFCKDSB DS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFPKDSB	SCROLL ===> CSR	JENCE
OPTION		CURRENT VALUE	
AUDITKEYLIFEPKDS AUDITKEYLIFETKDS	Audit CCA symmetric key lifecycle events Audit CCA asymmetric key lifecycle events Audit PKCS #11 key lifecycle events Audit CCA symmetric key usage events	TOKEN(Y),LABEL(Y) TOKEN(Y),LABEL(Y) TOKO(N),SESSO(N) TOK(Y),LAB(Y), INT(001/00.00.00)	
AUDITKEYUSGPKDS	Audit CCA asymmetric key usage events	TOK(Y),LAB(Y), INT(001/00.00.00)	
AUDITPKCS11USG	Audit PKCS #11 usage events	TOKO(N),SESSO(N), NOKEY(N), INT(001/00.00.00)	
CHECKAUTH	RACF check authorized callers	NO	
CICSAUDIT	Audit CICS client identity	NO	
COMPAT	Allow CUSP/PCF compatibility	NO	
COMPLIANCEWARN	Compliance Warn mode	NOT SPECIFIED	
CTRACE	CTRACE parmlib used at ICSF startup	CTICSF00	
DEFAULTWRAP	Default symmetric key wrapping - internal	ORIGINAL	
DEFAULTWRAP DOMAIN	Default symmetric key wrapping - external Current domain index or usage domain index	ORIGINAL 2	
FIPSMODE	Operate PKCS #11 in FIPS 140-2 mode	NO,FAIL(NO)	

COMMAND ===>		SCROLL ===> CSR	
Active CK	DS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFCKDSB		
Active PK	DS: SYS1.SESG.CSF.CSFPKDSB		INFLUENCE
Active TK	DS:		
OPTION		CURRENT VALUE	
KDSREFDAYS	Number of days between reference updates	1	
KEYARCHMSG	JOBLOG message for archived key use	NO	
MASTERKCVLEN	Length of master key verification patterns	ALL	
MAXSESSOBJECTS	Max non-auth pgm PKCS #11 session objects	65535	
REASONCODES	Source of callable services reason codes	ICSF	
RNGCACHE	Random Number Generate cache enabled	YES	
SERVICELIBS	Load ICSF using Service Data Sets	NO	
SERVSCSFM0D0	Data Set for Dynamic Service Update	IGNORED	
SERVSIEALNKE	Data Set for Dynamic Service Update	IGNORED	
SSM	Special Secure Mode enabled	YES	
STATS	Crypto Usage Statistics	ENG,SRV,ALG	
STATSFILTERS	Crypto Usage Statistics Filters	NOTKUSERID(N)	
SYSPLEXCKDS	Sysplex consistency for CKDS updates	YES,FAIL(NO)	
SYSPLEXPKDS	Sysplex consistency for PKDS updates	YES,FAIL(NO)	
SYSPLEXTKDS	Sysplex consistency for TKDS updates	NO,FAIL(NO)	
USERPARM	User specified parameter data	USERPARM	
WAITLIST	Source of CICS Wait List if CICS installed	default	

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## ICSF – Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility – ARE

CKDS Browser.	RK + INFLUENCE
Change master key utility, including the panel for a local change	
master key, the Coordinated KDS administration service, and	
CSFEUTIL.	
PCF CKDS to ICSF CKDS conversion utility.	
Coordinated KDS Administration.	
Master key entry utility.	
Compatibility service for the PCF CIPHER macro.	
Compatibility service for the PCF EMK macro.	
Compatibility service for the PCF GENKEY macro.	
Generate key fingerprint. Required by KGUP if key lifecycle	
auditing is enabled.	
Key generation utility program.	
Operational key load.	
Cryptographic processors management (activate/deactivate).	
PKDS reencipher and PKDS refresh utilities.	
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- - - -	CKDS Browser.Change master key utility, including the panel for a local change master key, the Coordinated KDS administration service, and CSFEUTIL.PCF CKDS to ICSF CKDS conversion utility.Coordinated KDS Administration.Master key entry utility.Compatibility service for the PCF CIPHER macro.Compatibility service for the PCF EMK macro.Compatibility service for the PCF GENKEY macro.Generate key fingerprint. Required by KGUP if key lifecycle auditing is enabled.Key generation utility program.Operational key load.Cryptographic processors management (activate/deactivate).PKDS reencipher and PKDS refresh utilities.

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### ICSF – Integrated Cryptographic Service Facily – ARE

Refresh CKDS or PKDS utility, including the panels for a local refresh, the Coordinated KDS Administration	RK + INFLUENCE
service, and CSFEUTIL (CKDS) and CSFPUTIL	
(PKDS).	
Reencipher CKDS or PKDS utility, including the panels	
for a local refresh, the Coordinated KDS Administration	
service, and CSFEUTIL (CKDS) and CSFPUTIL	
(PKDS).	
Administrative control functions utility (ENABLE).	
CKDS Conversion rewrap option	
Compatibility service for the CUSP or PCF RETKEY	
macro.	
Set master key utility.	
Administrative control functions utility (DISABLE).	
User Defined Extensions (UDX) management functions.	ଡ଼୕ୄ୲ୠ୕
	service, and CSFEUTIL (CKDS) and CSFPUTIL (PKDS). Reencipher CKDS or PKDS utility, including the panels for a local refresh, the Coordinated KDS Administration service, and CSFEUTIL (CKDS) and CSFPUTIL (PKDS). Administrative control functions utility (ENABLE). CKDS Conversion rewrap option Compatibility service for the CUSP or PCF RETKEY macro. Set master key utility. Administrative control functions utility (DISABLE).

# ICSF – Integrated Cryptographic Service Facily – ARE

The CSFSERV class grants access to the service if there is no covering profile, but with the following exceptions:

- Key Data Set Update (CSFKDU and CSFKDU6)
- Key Data Set Record Retrieve (CSFRRT and CSFRRT6)

Does your RACF profile for CSFSERV look something like this

RDEF CSFSERV \*\* UACC(READ)



- ICSF, CSFSERV, CSFKEY, CRYPTOZ.
- Is this alphabet soup?
- What is this about?
- This session gives a basic understanding of key setup in RACF and the roles and responsibilities for setting this up.

# Your feedback is important!



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